Do Muslims Vote Islamic? by KURZMAN, Charles & NAQVI, Syed Ijlal Hussain
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
4-2010
Do Muslims Vote Islamic?
Charles KURZMAN
Syed Ijlal Hussain NAQVI
Singapore Management University, ijlalnaqvi@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0163
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Islamic World and Near East History Commons, and the
Political Science Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
KURZMAN, Charles, & NAQVI, Syed Ijlal Hussain.(2010). Do Muslims Vote Islamic?. Journal of Democracy, 21(2), 50-63.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1099
do muslims vote islamic?
Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi
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Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is the author of Democracy Denied, 1905–
1915 (2008) and the editor of Liberal Islam (1998) and Modernist Is-
lam, 1840–1940 (2002). Ijlal Naqvi, a doctoral student in sociology at 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, is currently conduct-
ing dissertation fieldwork on the power industry and state-society rela-
tions in Pakistan.
If Muslim-majority countries hold free and fair (or at least competitive) 
elections, should we expect Islamic parties to dominate such contests? 
The authoritarian regimes that rule many of these societies have used 
the prospect of landslide victories by Islamic parties as a justification 
for repression, and these regimes’ allies in the United States and Europe 
seem to have accepted the premise. Knowledgeable observers point to 
the electoral success of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria (1991), 
the Justice and Development Party in Turkey (2002 and 2007), and the 
Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in Palestine (2006), implying 
that democratization in more Muslim societies will bring more Islamist 
movements to power.
We make no predictions about the outcome of any future election. 
Yet if this handful of past elections is going to be used as an argument 
against future efforts toward democratization, it is worth looking at the 
entire range of elections in which Islamic parties have taken part—not 
just the ones in which such parties emerged victorious or otherwise did 
notably well. It turns out that Islamic movements have entered the elec-
toral fray quite often—more than 160 times over the past generation, in 
fact—and most have attracted less than 8 percent of the vote. From this 
record, we draw four conclusions.
The first is that electoral participation by Islamic parties is far from 
unusual. Many Muslims have had the opportunity to vote for Islamic 
parties. Over the past forty years, 89 parliamentary elections in 21 coun-
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tries have included one or more Islamic parties, according to election 
reports from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (for a full list, see the Ap-
pendix on the Journal of Democracy’s website).1 Since the end of the 
Cold War two decades ago, this participation has accelerated. More than 
three elections per year have been contested by Islamic parties during 
this period, as compared with fewer than two elections per year in previ-
ous decades. The number of Islamic parties taking part has jumped as 
well: It is now common for multiple Islamic parties to vie for the same 
votes, splitting their potential constituency. Indonesia, the world’s larg-
est Muslim country, offers an extreme example of this. There, up to nine 
parties staking out a wide range of positions have each claimed to be the 
political voice of Islam.
This variety of positions is typical of the world’s Islamic parties. 
By that term, we mean all those parties that seek to increase the role 
of Islam in political life. Many of them self-identify by using the term 
“Islamic” in their names and manifestos, and by participating in inter-
national conferences of Islamic parties.2 Others are identified as Islamic 
by outside observers such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which of-
ten characterizes party ideologies in its election reports, or by contribu-
tors to Wikipedia, who have created a page listing Islamic parties.3 Yet 
these parties disagree intensely about what Islam means and what role it 
should play in the public sphere. At least one “Islamic” party, Turkey’s 
Justice and Development Party (AKP), has removed almost every refer-
ence to Islam from its electoral platforms, and instead describes itself 
simply as a “conservative” party.4 
To understand what Islamic parties stand for, we collected and ana-
lyzed 48 of their electoral platforms dating from 1969 to 2009. This is 
the largest such collection ever assembled, though we were able to find 
platforms for only a third of the total number of Islamic parties that have 
run for parliament in one country or another. Half the platforms in this 
collection call for the implementation of shari‘a (Islamic law). Of those 
two-dozen shari‘a-advocating platforms, one in three says nothing about 
who would decide exactly what constitutes shari‘a. Half say that shari‘a 
would be decided according to the Islamic principles of consensus and 
consultation (shura). The remaining handful endorse the idea of defining 
Islamic law by means of a singular authority in one form or another. The 
2007 platform of Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, for example, 
proposed the naming of a grand mufti as chief Islamic legal authority for 
the country. (This platform also declares: “Our objective is the construc-
tion of a modern state according to the principles of Islam, of democratic 
choice, and of the republican system.”)5 None of the platforms invokes 
anything like the theocratic system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even 
the platforms of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, whose leaders have sometimes en-
dorsed the Iranian concept of velayat-e faqih (rule by the supreme Islamic 
legal expert), steer clear of calling for an Iranian-style system.6
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At the same time, more than three-quarters of the platforms specifi-
cally endorse democracy. Most of these define democracy in secular 
terms as the selection of governmental leaders by the majority of citi-
zens, while others justify democracy in Islamic terms. The 1992 and 
1997 platforms of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, for example, 
referred to “shura democracy”—shura is a term from the Koran, and 
is often taken as a synonym or precursor or justification for electoral 
democracy. The 1997 platform says that shura means: 
The people’s right to decide on their affairs and choose their rulers, moni-
toring them and making them accountable and ensuring their adherence—
in the decisions they make and creation of conditions for the nation’s 
good—to take the opinion of the people directly or through their repre-
sentatives, so that no individual or one party monopolizes the state to the 
exclusion of others.7
For each platform in the collection, we coded the three issues that the 
platform seemed to treat as most important. The most frequently men-
tioned theme was the economy, which was among the top three issues 
for 19 of 48 platforms. Implementation of shari‘a was next: There were 
17 platforms that ranked it among the top three concerns. In third place 
was “the improvement of Islamic morals”; this made the top-three-issues 
list in 15 platforms. (Just over half the platforms placed either shari‘a 
or morals among the top three issues.) Democratization or liberalization 
was among the top three issues for 11 platforms, as was reform of the 
political structure.
Perhaps because Islamic parties have now become relatively routine, 
they seem to have little impact on civil conflict. The best predictor of 
civil conflict in these countries during and after an election is the exis-
tence of civil conflict before an election. The participation and perfor-
mance of Islamic parties make little dent in this relationship. (In order 
to gauge civil conflict, we used as proxy variables incidents recorded in 
the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland and the 
Armed Conflict Dataset at the International Peace Research Institute in 
Oslo, Norway.)8 Islamic electoral politics has not proven a panacea for 
civil conflict, at least not in the short run—but neither does it seem to 
have made strife more widespread.
Running Strong—or Also-Rans?
Our second conclusion is that the electoral performance of Islamic 
parties has been generally unimpressive. In the 89 elections that Is-
lamic parties have contested during the past generation, these parties 
have typically received only a small fraction of the vote. In Pakistan, for 
example, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and other Islamic parties have run in 
elections, on and off, for more than half a century. These parties reached 
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a high-water mark of 18 percent of seats in the national parliament in 
1977, then ebbed below 7 percent over the next two decades. In 2002, a 
coalition of Islamic parties rebounded to garner 11 percent of the vote 
and 17 percent of seats—a major recovery, but still representing only 
a small chunk of the electorate even in an election that several major 
parties boycotted. These elections were not entirely free and fair, to be 
sure. Yet they did offer voters a chance to elect candidates from Is-
lamic parties, and the voters mostly declined to do so. In 1977, the JI 
won 29 percent of the seats that it contested; in 2002, 27 percent of its 
coalition’s candidates won. In 2008, the JI chose not to compete, but a 
smaller Islamic party, the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam, won only 6 of the 108 
districts in which it fielded a candidate.
It is worth noting that Pakistan is one country where Islamic parties 
(which do not include the large and powerful Pakistan Muslim League, 
despite its name) have actually performed above the norm. In Bangla-
desh, Islamic parties have participated in six parliamentary elections, 
notching their best showing in 1991 with 12 percent of the vote. Since 
then, they have struggled. In December 2008, the main Islamic party 
won less than 5 percent of the vote and only 2 of the 38 seats that it 
contested. A variety of smaller Islamic parties ran a total of more than a 
dozen candidates, yet failed to win even a single seat.
Across all 89 parliamentary elections of the past forty years in which 
an Islamic party participated, the median performance was 7.3 percent 
of the vote and 6 percent of the seats. If we combine the tallies of all the 
Islamic parties that participated in a given election, the median Islamic-
party performance is 15.5 percent of votes and 15 percent of seats—not 
an insignificant portion, but hardly the lion’s share. The presence of Is-
lamic parties did not substantially increase voter turnout, which further 
suggests the relative lack of voter enthusiasm for them. When turnout 
was higher, this did not boost the percentage of seats that Islamic par-
ties won. 
This performance has improved slightly over time, as shown in Fig-
ure 1 below, which displays the seat percentages won by Islamic parties 
(tracking vote percentages would reveal a similar pattern, but fewer data 
points are available). Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was the 
high point in 1991, followed by Turkey’s AKP (2002 and 2006), Hamas 
(2006), Hezbollah in Lebanon (2005 and 2009, counting only the seats 
reserved for Shias in the country’s complex constitutional scheme), and 
Islamic parties or coalitions in Bahrain (2002 and 2006), Iraq (2005), 
and Jordan (1989). Below this small set of high-achieving Islamic par-
ties is a much larger number of ideologically similar formations that do 
poorly. Moreover, of the 32 Islamic parties that competed more than 
once over the past two decades, four increased their representation by 5 
percent or more, six decreased their representation by the same margin, 
and most have not changed much.
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With this context in mind, let us look at the handful of elections that 
Islamic parties have won. Most of these were the first truly competi-
tive contests that these countries had experienced in a generation or 
more. In Jordan (1989), Algeria (1991), Bahrain (2002), Iraq (2005), 
and Palestine (2006), repressive secular regimes had long monopolized 
power, and Islamic parties promised a fresh start. Even under such ex-
ceptional circumstances, however, Islamic parties enjoy no guarantee of 
success. They won only a fraction of the vote in breakthrough elections 
in Yemen (1993), Indonesia (1999), Tajikistan (2000), and elsewhere. 
After the breakthrough, Islamic parties fared worse. In Jordan, a dra-
matic example, three-quarters of Islamist candidates were elected in the 
breakthrough election of 1989; this figure dropped to half in subsequent 
elections, and then to a quarter in the most recent election, which took 
place in 2007. In general, the more routine elections become, the worse 
Islamic parties do in them.
Do Freer Elections Help Islamists?
Of course, not all of these elections have been fully free and fair. In 
Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood has not been allowed to for-
mally become a party—its candidates have to run as independents—and 
it is has been subject to state harassment and mass arrests during electoral 
campaigns. Yet the Muslim Brotherhood and many other Islamic parties 
1970 1980 1990 2000
Note: The percentage of seats in parliament won by 165 Islamic parties and movements in 
89 elections, as reported by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and other sources. The dashed 
line represents a linear prediction plot generated by a regression of the percentage of seats 
on election year.
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have persisted in their attempts to engage in electoral politics, despite 
such barriers. The poor performance of Islamic parties in these repressive 
contexts is in part a result of the rigged electoral system.
But in those Muslim-majority countries where elections were freest, 
Islamic parties performed worse. This finding forms our third conclu-
sion, one that holds consistent across multiple measures of electoral 
fairness. The measures include:
Judith Kelley’s “Quality of Elections” variable, which is based • 
on the annual country-by-country human-rights reports that the 
U.S. State Department puts out. A country is coded as “represen-
tative” if the report makes make clear that elections there repre-
sent the will of the people. Countries that fall short are coded as 
“unrepresentative” or “ambiguous.”9
Freedom House’s “political rights” scale, which is based on an • 
annual survey of experts on each country. Using this scale, we 
categorized countries as having “greater political rights” if they 
scored in the top two of seven ranks with respect to the fairness 
of the electoral process, the extent of political pluralism and 
participation, and the functioning of government. Countries that 
fell short of the top two ranks we categorized as having “limited 
political rights.”10
Polity IV’s “Electoral Competitiveness” scale, which is based • 
on experts’ annual assessments of each country. Countries are 
categorized as “factional,” “electoral transition,” or “institution-
alized” (scoring seven or higher on a ten-point scale) if political 
groups regularly compete for influence through elections. Other-
wise, countries are categorized as “repressed,” “suppressed,” or 
“uninstitutionalized.”11
Our own “Electoral Irregularities” variable, which we developed • 
for this project. These irregularities are coded as “systematic” if 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s electoral report mentions signif-
icant governmental barriers to Islamic political parties, such as 
prevention from registration as an official political party, limita-
tion on the number of candidates permitted to run for parliament, 
harassment of candidates or their supporters, or manipulation of 
vote counts.12
Under all four of these methods of categorization, Islamic parties 
fared worse in freer elections than in less-free ones (see Table 1 below). 
According to Kelley’s coding of U.S. State Department reports, for ex-
ample, the most successful Islamic party won a median of 9.8 percent 
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of parliamentary seats in freer elections, and 14.0 percent of seats in 
less-free elections. The median for all Islamic parties in a given election 
was 11.5 percent under freer conditions and 15.9 percent under less-free 
conditions. The Kurzman and Naqvi categories, which refer specifically 
to the experience of Islamic parties as opposed to parties as a whole, 
yield an even larger differential: The median percentage of seats won by 
Islamic parties in freer elections was almost 10 percentage points lower 
than the percentage won in less-free elections.
This pattern is visible across all Muslim-majority countries, whether 
they are Arab or non-Arab. Overall, Islamic parties have done better in 
Arab countries than elsewhere, winning an average of 15 percent more 
seats. At the same time, Arab countries have had fewer democratic elec-
tions than Muslim countries outside the Arab world.13 Within the Arab 
world, the median seat total for Islamic parties was several percentage 
points lower in relatively free as compared to less-free elections.
These findings run directly counter to concerns that free elections will 
lead inevitably to victories by Islamic parties. A caveat is in order, how-
ever: The freeness of elections in a given country may be directly related 
to the government’s estimate of how popular Islamic parties are there. If 
governments restrict electoral freedoms more in countries where Islamic 
Number of 
electioNs with 
at least oNe 
islamic party
mediaN % of 
seats woN by 
top islamic 
party
mediaN % of 
seats woN by 
all islamic 
parties
Kelley Quality of Elections Data, based on U.S. State Dept. reports, 1977–2004
Unrepresentative or ambiguous 32 14.0 15.9
Representative of the will of 
the people
28  9.8 11.5
Freedom House, Political Rights Scale, 1972–2009
Limited political rights 75 12.9 15.5
Greater political rights 7 1.0 6.3
Polity IV, Electoral Competitiveness, 1970–2008
Repressed, suppressed, or 
uninstitutionalized
55 12.9 15.2
Factional, electoral transition, 
or institutionalized
19  9.6 10.4
Kurzman and Naqvi Electoral Irregularities, based on Inter-Parliamentary Union 
reports, 1970–2009
Islamic parties face systematic 
electoral irregularities
41 15.0 20.4
Islamic parties face fewer 
electoral irregularities
44  8.0 10.5
table 1—islamic-party performaNce iN freer aNd less-
free parliameNtary electioNs
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parties seem to be popular, then Muslim societies with free elections 
would tend to be places where Islamic parties are less popular. 
A further caveat has to do with the practice of running partial electoral 
slates. In a number of countries with semi-free elections, Islamic parties 
run candidates only in a limited number of districts out of fear that run-
ning in more will make the government nervous and lead to stepped-up 
repression. Just before the 2003 voting in Jordan, for example, a leader 
in the Islamic movement noted that his party “had assured the palace 
that they did not seek to gain a majority in the upcoming elections.”14 
In Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah might have won several more than 11 
of 27 Shia seats had the Syrian government not required it to limit the 
number of candidates that it fielded.15 At times it may be hard to know 
whether partial slates reflect government pressure or an Islamic party’s 
own choice to focus on districts where it has the best chance. In Malay-
sia, for example, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party contested 46 of 192 
seats in 1995 (winning 7); 63 of 193 seats in 1999 (winning 27); 84 of 
219 in 2004 (winning 7); and 68 of 222 in 2008 (winning 23).16
Liberalizing or Radicalizing? 
Among Islamic parties that have joined national elections, there has 
been a trend toward the adoption of more liberal electoral platforms, as 
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 below. Prior to the mid-1990s, a majority of 
the platforms in our collection favored the implementation of shari‘a and 
a ban on interest and made some mention of jihad and opposition to Israel. 
Since that time, half or fewer of the platforms since have adopted such po-
sitions. By contrast, recent platforms are more likely to mention democ-
racy, the rights of women, and the rights of minorities. Hence our fourth 
and final conclusion: Islamic parties have (relative to their starting point) 
liberalized their stances significantly over the past several decades.
Looking at the twelve Islamic parties for which we can construct a 
“platform timeline” of sorts—that is, two or more platforms from dif-
ferent dates—we can see slight shifts in a liberalizing direction. Four of 
these parties dropped their support for shari‘a (for the record, they were 
the Renaissance Movement in Algeria, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, 
the Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh, and the Justice and Development Party 
in Morocco). No party added a call for shari‘a to its agenda. Eight par-
ties maintained their position across time, and split evenly: Four contin-
ued promising to implement shari‘a, and four continued to offer no such 
pledge. On the issue of democracy, three parties switched—and all moved 
toward offering secular justifications for democracy. Three of five parties 
that referred to jihad in their platforms removed this reference in later 
platforms (they were Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamaat-i-Islami in 
Bangladesh, and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform).
By any standard, these are still highly conservative parties, and there 
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are occasional examples of movement away from liberalization as well. 
The most widely noted case concerns the Egyptian Muslim Brother-
hood. In August 2007, it circulated a new platform draft that proposed, 
for the first time, naming a council of religious scholars whose mis-
sion would be to advise the government regarding the compatibility of 
its programs and policies with shari‘a. In some cases, moreover, this 
council would have the authority to overrule state decisions on grounds 
drawn from Islamic law. 
This marked a departure from the Brotherhood’s earlier platforms, 
which had always proposed allowing current government bodies to make 
decisions concerning compatibility with shari‘a. In its 2005 platform, 
the Brotherhood offered the general principle that “there is no one in Is-
lam who has religious authority—whoever he is—except the authority of 
good preaching, calling for good and warning of evil.” By advocating the 
creation of an authoritative religious body, the 2007 draft rescinded this 
principle. At the same time, the 2007 draft—which the Brotherhood never 
formally adopted, perhaps because of the outcry that it sparked—waxed 
more liberal on other issues. It called for stronger support of women’s 
rights, for instance (though here too, its recommendation that women be 
kept ineligible for the presidency roused controversy).17
Notwithstanding the exceptions, the Islamic parties’ overall trend to-
ward publicly embracing global norms of democracy and human rights 
is significant. It is visible not just at the party level, but also in the 
ideals and behavior of individual activists. As political scientist Carrie 
Rosefsky Wickham has noted, many leading Islamic politicians seem to 
be changed men—two decades ago, it was hard to find one who would 
shake a woman’s hand or engage in interfaith dialogue, but today many 
do. The experience of political participation, both in government and in 
figure 2—iNcreasiNg islamic-party platform themes
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civil society, has changed their outlooks in ways that they did not imag-
ine when they started down the path of electoral politics.18
One mechanism for this transformation is the strategic goal of ap-
pealing to swing voters. As they compete with secular parties and rival 
Islamic formations, Islamic parties can either resign themselves to fringe 
status or move toward the center of the ideological spectrum. This cen-
ter, in most Muslim societies, is culturally conservative and politically 
liberal. According to the World Values Survey, which has polled more 
than eighty countries over the past decade, Muslims are just as likely 
to support democratic ideals as non-Muslims, but are considerably less 
comfortable with abortion, divorce, and the employment of mothers 
of young children. The survey’s Muslim respondents overwhelmingly 
favor multiparty elections, and they also believe that political leaders 
should be inspired by religious values.19 Islamic parties are not alone in 
targeting this median position. Many secular parties in Muslim societ-
ies—and in many other societies besides—appeal to constituencies of 
culturally conservative democrats.
Yet popular religiosity may not be the most significant factor shap-
ing the performance of Islamic parties. In Pakistan, for example, 62 per-
cent of the adult population believed in 2001 that “good government . 
. . should implement only the laws of the shari‘a.” In Bangladesh, 44 
percent of respondents said the same. Yet few voters supported the Is-
lamic parties that claimed to share this goal. In Egypt, 80 percent of 
respondents favored implementation of shari‘a in a 2000 survey; that 
same year, a only quarter of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidates won 
election to parliament. Five years later, with surveyed support for shari‘a 
declining slightly, 61 percent of the Brotherhood’s candidates won.20 In 
figure 3—decreasiNg islamic-party platform themes
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this and other instances, Islamic-party success seems to have been based 
on factors separate from popular support for the implementation of Is-
lamic law. For example, an exit poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy 
and Survey Research showed that Hamas’s electoral victory in 2006, 
with 44 percent of the vote, was due far more to voters’ concerns about 
corruption and the lack of security than 
to religiosity.21
Throughout the past generation, Is-
lamic parties have faced resistance from 
Islamic revolutionaries who object to 
electoral politics. Most famously, al-
Qaeda’s leaders have consistently de-
nounced voting as a human usurpation 
of divine authority. Two decades ago, 
even before allying himself with Osama 
bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote a 
tract condemning the Muslim Brother-
hood’s abandonment of revolutionary 
methods in favor of electoral politics, equating this decision with apos-
tasy: “Whoever labels himself as a Muslim democrat, or a Muslim who 
calls for democracy, is like saying he is a Jewish Muslim or a Christian 
Muslim.”22 
When Hamas decided to participate in the Palestinian elections in 
2006, Zawahiri issued a series of statements that called the Palestinian Is-
lamists sellouts.23 During the 2008 elections in Pakistan, the local Taliban 
accused the country’s Islamic parties of seeking to enrich themselves with 
the perks of office.24 In several countries, Islamic-party leaders have faced 
violent attacks by militants. During the bloody civil war that wracked Al-
geria in the 1990s, dozens of leaders of the Movement for an Islamic So-
ciety (now the Movement for a Peaceful Society), which favored a peace 
settlement, were assassinated—some by Islamic revolutionaries and oth-
ers by state-security forces. In Iraq, Sunni Islamic revolutionaries have 
recently renewed their campaign “to start killing all those participating in 
the political process,” according to a warning received by a Sunni politi-
cian who was subsequently assassinated in Mosul.25
The proliferation of Islamic parties in the electoral process—despite 
unfair conditions, threats from revolutionaries, and a generally poor re-
cord of vote-getting so far—is a sign of how far such parties have gone 
in embracing liberalization. A quarter-century ago, many of these move-
ments sought to replicate the Iranian Revolution and create an Islamic 
society by overthrowing the state. By the end of the twentieth century, 
however, most Islamic activists found themselves disillusioned with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and other Islamic states such as Sudan or Tali-
ban-run Afghanistan. Even in Iraq, where a majority of Shias voted for 
Islamic parties in the 2005 parliamentary elections, less than a quarter of 
By the end of the twenti-
eth century, most Islamic 
activists found them-
selves disillusioned with 
the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and other Islamic 
states such as Sudan or 
Taliban-run Afghanistan.
61Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi
Shia survey respondents said that they favored a theocratic system like 
Iran’s. Only 6 percent of Iraqi Sunnis favored such a system.26
Instead, Islamic parties may be reprising an earlier historical moment, 
the watershed period of the early twentieth century when demands for 
democracy and human rights first gained mass support in Muslim-ma-
jority societies. In 1905, Muslims of the Volga Basin, the Caucasus, and 
Central Asia joined the rest of the Russian Empire’s people in agitating 
for a representative assembly. In 1906, Iranians staged large sit-ins to 
force the shah to accept a constitution and an elected parliament. At its 
first meeting, in 1907, the All-India Muslim League unanimously ad-
opted a resolution favoring elections under the British colonial regime. 
In 1908, Ottomans celebrated en masse when the sultan was forced to 
reinstate the constitution and schedule parliamentary elections. Many 
Islamic leaders participated actively in these movements. The Shaykh 
al-Islam, the Ottoman Empire’s highest-ranking Islamic official, sided 
with the democracy movement and against the sultan. The two most 
influential Shia scholars of the era sent telegrams calling opposition to 
constitutionalism un-Islamic.27
Then, as now, reactionary religious forces resisted the entry of Is-
lamic parties into electoral politics. But that was not what ultimately 
undermined the democratic trend in early twentieth-century Muslim so-
cieties. Rather, it was secular authoritarians—the Committee of Union 
and Progress and later Mustafa Kemal in the Ottoman Empire, the 
Bakhtiyaris and later Reza Khan in Iran, and European colonial authori-
ties elsewhere—who dismissed parliaments, shuttered newspapers, and 
suppressed prodemocratic Islamic movements.
It would be premature to suggest that this history is about to repeat 
itself. But one aspect of the story already looks like a rerun. Just as they 
did a century ago, authoritarian states and Islamic revolutionaries alike 
are striving to keep Islamic political parties from competing freely for 
votes. The authoritarians have succeeded in one sense: Islamic parties 
have won very few elections. In a broader sense, however, the efforts to 
suppress these parties are failing. The evidence suggests that suppres-
sion of Islamic electoral options only makes them more popular with 
voters. According to the World Values Survey, support for shari‘a is 
highest in the countries with the lowest levels of political freedom, such 
as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.28 By contrast, when Muslims are given the 
opportunity to vote freely for Islamic parties, they have tended not to 
do so.
NOTES
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1. Inter-Parliamentary Union, PARLINE Database on National Parliaments; available 
at www.ipu.org. Iran is excluded from this analysis because the Islamic Republic requires 
all parties to proclaim Islamic ideals. Independent Islamic candidates who are not affili-
ated with any party are counted as though they formed a single “party.” For the Appendix, 
see www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/KurzmanAppendix-21-2.pdf.
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